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1.11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v Richfield City, 798 P. 2d 757, 
759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of error 
standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089,1092 (Utah 
1991); Ward, 798R2dat 759. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant was denied, pursuant to a final agency action October 11, 1996, 
unemployment compensation for reason that he is collecting social security which, when 
calculated by the Department, reduced his unemployment benefit amount to zero. Agency found 
that appellant owed a no-fault overpayment of $5967 based upon the fact that he received a 
retroactive social security benefit payment in March 1996 for periods of eligibility in 1995 and 
1996. 
Agency has defined social security benefits as "retirement" and so interpreted the statute 
governing unemployment compensation. The agency concluded that appellant's unemployment 
benefits should be reduced to zero and no benefits paid; however, agency definition and 
application of the statute is not consistent with federal court rulings interpreting purpose of 
Social Security Act. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant met all eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation pursuant to 
U.C.A. 35-4-403(1) "Eligibility of Individual" and benefits were paid to him for periods of June 
and July 1995, and January-May 1996. 
When appellant began receiving social security benefits the agency recomputed his 
unemployment compensation benefits and reduced that amount to zero pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-
401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits". The agency also determined a no-fault overpayment 
existed pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-406(5)(a) when it applied a retroactive social security payment 
to past unemployment benefits appellant had received. 
The agency defines social security as "retirement" under a plan maintained or 
contributed to by a base period employer. The federal courts have held that social security is not 
"retirement" but a form of social insurance and it is mandated by federal law that an employer 
and employee pay into the fund for future benefits due the appellant; however, the agency has 
defined social security as "retirement" under its definition as set out in U.A.C. R562-401-207 
"Retirement or Disability Retirement Income" and the rule is contrary to federal law. 
"Social Security is not a retirement plan maintained or contributed to by a base period 
employer", it is not a voluntary contribution nor is it one appellant contracted for in terms of 
employment; wherefore, social security contributions are required by law. 
Appellant contends the agency interpretation of the statute and the statute itself is vague 
as applied to him. Congress did not intend social security to be a "retirement" benefit and the 
language of the Utah statute does not conform to federal law. 
After exhausting all administrative remedies the appellant filed the current appeal. 
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT WAS DETERMINED ELIGIBLE 
FOR UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS; HOWEVER, THE 
AGENCY DETERMINED THAT HIS WEEKLY BENEFIT 
AMOUNT WOULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO FOR REASON 
THAT HE IS RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AND 
RECOMPUTED BENEFITS ALREADY PAID TO HIM WHICH 
CREATED A NO-FAULT OVERPAYMENT. 
AGENCY PROCEEDINGS 
6/6/95 appellant filed for unemployment compensation pursuant to U.C.A. 35-4-403(1) 
"Eligibility of Individual" and it was determined by the agency that appellant was monetarily 
eligible to receive a weekly benefit amount of $253 for twenty-six weeks effective June 4, 1995 
and benefits were paid to him. [R 1-2] 
July 1995 appellant returned to work until he was laid off due to reduction of force 
December 1995. 
January 4, 1996 appellant re-opened his unemployment claim and benefits were denied 
pursuant to decision of the agency in letter 1/19/96. [R-4] 
January 24, 1996 appellant filed an appeal from that decision. [R-6] 
January 29, 1996 decision was made by representative of agency reversing denial of 
benefits and removing benefit overpayment assessed on claim. [R-7] 
February 5, 1996 appellant filed an appeal of decision 1/29/96. [R-8] 
February 20, 1996, pursuant to agency notice, agency decisions were reversed, 
appellant's appeals were withdrawn and unemployment benefits paid to appellant. No hearing 
was held on the matter. [R-9] 
May 3, 1996 appellant again filed for unemployment benefits. [R 10-11] 
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May 31, 1996, Unemployment Benefit Overpayment Notice was issued denying benefits 
and notice that a no-fault overpayment of $401 had been created. [R-13] 
May 31, 1996 Unemployment Benefit Overpayment Notice was issued as a result of 
recomputation of benefits paid on claim and a no-fault overpayment of $5566 had been created. 
[R-14] 
May 31, 1996 Decision of Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits was issued that base 
period wages used to calculate weekly benefit amount have been reduced "...because you have 
begun to receive retirement benefits based upon your work which are deductible from your 
claim..:'. [R-17] 
June 6, 1996 Statement of Retirement Income filed by appellant. [R-16] 
June 3, 1996 determination of benefit amount recomputed to reduce weekly benefit 
amount to zero sent to appellant. [R-17] 
June 6, 1996 appellant filed an appeal from Decision of Representative. [R-18] 
June 13, 1996 Determination of Benefit amount and Notice of Agency Action and 
Formal Adjudicative Proceeding mailed to appellant. [R-22] 
June 17, 1996 appellant filed an Appeal from Decision of Representative. [R-23] 
Notice of Hearing mailed to appellant June 20, 1996 scheduling hearing for July 1, 1996. 
[R-27] 
July 1,1996 hearing held before the agency. [R 28-54] 
July 3, 1996 Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed to appellant. [R 55-59] 
July 26, 1996 appellant filed Appeal to the Board of Review. [R-60] 
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September 9,1996 Decision of the Board of Review issued and mailed to appellant. 
[R 64-69] 
September 16, 1996 and September 20, 1996 appellant filed a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Board of Review. [R 69-70; R-74] 
October 11,1996 Reconsideration and Decision of Board of Review issued and mailed to 
appellant. [R 76-79] 
November 16, 1996 Petition For Writ of Review filed by appellant. [R 80-82] 
It was determined by the agency that appellant had received retroactive social security 
payments for various months he claimed unemployment insurance, specifically unemployment 
benefits received for the months of June and July 1995 and January 1996 through May 1996. 
All retirement elements had been met so as to constitute a recomputation of claimants 
weekly benefit amount and concluded that appellant was receiving Social Security retirement 
income which reduced his benefit amount by $267, to zero dollars and appellant was not 
monetarily eligible to receive unemployment benefits on benefit claims filed effective June 4, 
1995 through June 2, 1996. 
The Administrative Law Judge in his Conclusions of Law stated pursuant to U.C. A. 35-4-
401(2) of the Utah Employment Security Act that benefits payable to an individual eligible to 
receive retirement benefits must be recomputed and based authority for recomputation under 
U.A.C. R562-401-207 "Retirement or Disability Retirement Income". 
The Administrative Law Judge also found that appellant was not entitled to the 
unemployment benefits but is without fault in doing so, and need not repay the sum but the sum 
will be deducted from any future benefits payable to him. 
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EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
U.A.C. R562-202-101 "Preamble" states as follows: 
"(I) One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act, Utah 
Code Section 35-4-101 et seq., the Act, is to lighten the burdens of persons 
unemployed through no fault of their own by maintaining their purchasing 
power in the economy. The legislature, in establishing this program, 
recognized the substantial social ills associated with unemployment and 
sought to ameliorate these problems with a program to pay workers for a 
limited time while they seek other employment. It is because of these 
reasons that it is in the public interest to liberally construe and administer 
the Act...:' 
Purpose of the Employment Security Act is to provide temporary benefits for the 
unemployed worker who qualifies under provisions of the Act to help alleviate any hardship. 
Appellant had qualified, pursuant to eligibility requirements, and was experiencing a hardship 
which enabled him to collect unemployment compensation. Unemployment is not welfare, 
social security or a disability payment. It is not intended to provide households with a means of 
support but as a means to tide them over until other suitable employment is found. 
Eligibility was based in part on the fact that appellant had earned wages in two or more 
calendar quarters of the base period and total base period earnings were at least 1.5 times the 
wages in the highest quarter. Appellant was not receiving social security benefits at the time of 
his initial claim; however, it was disclosed to the agency that he had applied for social security 
benefits and all forms filed by appellant reflect that fact. [R-1,4,10,16] 
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Pursuant to California Dept Of Human Resources v Java 402 US 121,28 L Ed 2d 
666,91 S Ct 1347 (1971) the court held as follows: 
"...@pg 676 [h]istory makes clear that the thrust of the scheme for 
unemployment benefits was to take care of the need of displaced workers, 
pending a search for other employment..." 
"...@pg 674Unemployment benefits provide cash to a newly 
unemployed worker 'at a time when otherwise he would have nothing 
to spend", serving to maintain the recipient at subsistence levels without 
the necessity of his turning to welfare or private charity... 
...Finally, Congress viewed unemployment insurance payments as 
a means of exerting influence upon the stabilization of industry. "Their only 
distinguishing feature is that they will be specially earmarked for the use of 
the unemployed at the very times when it is best for business that they should 
be soused...." 
Appellant was a displaced worker when he applied for and was determined eligible for 
unemployment compensation. He was truly experiencing a hardship given the fact that he was 
earning no other income at the time he applied for unemployment compensation. 
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS - RETIREMENT 
Appellant is receiving old age benefits under the Social Security program which is 
primarily designed for persons who are no longer in the labor market. This does not mean that a 
person drawing old age benefits is disqualified from drawing unemployment benefits 
Commissioner of Labor v Renfroe, 486 SW2d 73, 56 ALR3d 547 (Ark 1972) 
"...@pg 551...Retirement pay is generally considered not to be a pension 
or gratuity but as adjusted compensation presently earned by an employee but 
payable in the future...." 
" @Pg 551...Perhaps the definition should more appropriately be stated 
conversely, i.e., retirement pay is compensation currently paid but previously 
earned by an employee. However the distinction may be stated, the various facets 
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of the Social Security Law prevent the benefits payable thereunder from falling 
into the category of retirement pay as defined above...." 
"...@pg 551 ...In the absence of any statutory definition of the term 
"retirement payment", we feel that the generally accepted concept of retirement 
pay should govern and that the result reached by the Indiana and Idaho courts 
is preferable to the urged by appellant...." 
Retirement pay is generally considered not to be a pension or gratuity but as adjusted 
compensation presently earned by an employee but payable in the future. The court has 
recognized that retirement pay falls into the category of compensation, at least when financed 
over a period of years by the joint contributions of both the employer and employee. 
Social security payments may not be subject to classification as gratuities, but the 
concept is such that it would be difficult to say that they are "retirement payment" in the sense of 
the Employment Security Act. The Social Security system may be accurately described as a 
form of social insurance, enacted pursuant to Congress' power to "spend money in aid of the 
general welfare" whereby persons gainfully employed, and those who employ them, are taxed to 
permit the payment of benefits to the retired and disabled and their dependants. A worker's 
benefits are not dependent upon the degree to which he was called upon to support the system by 
taxation. 
Social security payments can be deprived by appropriate government action if the 
beneficiary earns more than a stated annual sum unless he has passed the age of 72. An 
employee over 65 may receive social security payments without retiring so long as his earnings 
from employment do not exceed the statutory limit. 
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The State of Utah has defined retirement as follows: 
U.A.C. R562-401-207 "Retirement or Disability Retirement Income" 
"...(2)(a) Retirement income is defined as a pension or plan, paid for 
at least in part by an employer as contrasted to a IRA, KEOGH or other savings 
program which provides periodic payments following discontinuance of service to 
an individual who qualifies for the payment because of age, length of service, 
disability or combination of these qualifications...." (Emphasis Added) 
U.C.A. 35-4-401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits" 
"...(2)(c) "...The "weekly benefit amount" of an individual who 
is receiving, or who is eligible to receive, based upon the individual's previous 
employment, a pension, which includes a governmental, social security, or other 
pension, retirement or disability retirement pay, under a plan maintained or 
contributed to by a base-period employer is the "weekly benefit amount" which 
is computed under this section less 100% of such retirement benefits, that are 
attributable to a week, disregarding any fraction of $1...." (Emphasis Added) 
An employer and employee are required by law to contribute 7.65% to the social security 
program and given the fact that an employer and employee are required by law to contribute to 
the social security system means that it is not a "plan maintained or contributed to by a base 
period employer" pursuant to the state statute. 
Social Security is a noncontractual benefit under the social welfare program and not a 
"retirement" plan as defined by the state of Utah; therefore, appellant has no choice but to 
contribute and his contributions are not made pursuant to any employment contract or benefit he 
contracted for but mandated by federal law. 
Appellant's determination of eligibility for social security payments were made based 
upon employment earnings from 1937 to the end of 1994. Any other wages earned by appellant 
after 1994 will not be used by social security to increase benefit payments. Appellant is 
receiving all he will ever receive from social security. The statutory right to benefits is directly 
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related to years worked and amount earned by a covered employee and not to the need of the 
beneficiary directly and benefits have been afforded as a matter of right, related to past 
participation in the productive processes of the country. 
Persons gainfully employed and those who employ them are taxed to permit the payment 
of benefits to the retired and disabled and their dependents The expectation is that many 
members of the present productive work force will in turn become beneficiaries rather than 
supporters of the program. Each workers benefits, though flowing from the contributions he 
made to the national economy while actively employed, are not dependent on the degree to 
which he was called upon to support the system by taxation. The noncontractual interest of an 
employee covered by the Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of an annuity, 
whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual payments. 
Appellant is being penalized for being age 65 and not a "favorable employee in the work 
force due to his age". The evidence is impressive that among workers the younger men and 
women are preferred over the older. In times of retrenchment the older are commonly the first 
to go, and even if retained their wages are likely to be lowered based upon the fact that a 65 year 
old is not considered a good risk for employment training and expenditures for his employment 
since the likelihood is great that he would not be there for many years and the company could 
not recoup their investment based upon his work. 
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Persons aged 65 or older are limited in the types of employment they could obtain by 
virtue of the fact that employers do not hire these people for high paying jobs instead they hire 
them at the lowest wage possible therefore persons aged 65 or older still have to maintain some 
type of income to meet their monthly needs. 
Under the rules as set out by the agency persons aged 65 or older are double penalized if 
they collect social security benefits; however, the social security system was not designed nor 
intended to be a "retirement plan maintained or contributed to by a base period employer" but 
one of social insurance that was previously earned by an employee but payable in the future. 
Social security benefits are to some degree in the nature of insurance, providing present 
security and peace of mind from fear of future lack of earnings. 
The court in Flemmiag v Nestor 363 US 603,4 L Ed 2d 1435,80 S Ct 1367 (1960) held 
as follows: 
"...@pg 1443...Payment under the Act are based upon the wage earner's 
record of earnings in employment or self employment covered by the Act, and 
take the form of old-age insurance benefits inuring to the wage earner... 
"...Entitlement to benefits once gained is partially or 
totally lost if the beneficiary earns more than a stated annual sum, unless he 
or she is at least 72 years old... 
"...The social security system may be accurately described as a form of 
social insurance, enacted pursuant to congress' power to "spend money in aid of 
the 'general welfare,5" Helvering v Davis, supra (301 US at 640)...." 
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" @pg 1444...Social Security benefits is in one sense "earned", rests 
on the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years were 
functioning members of the economy may justly call upon that economy, in 
their later years for protection from "the rigors of the poor house as well as 
from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near." 
Helvering v Davis, supra (301 US at 641)...." 
States cannot and should not be allowed to subvert congressional intent of the enactment 
of the social security act otherwise it would raise a constitutional problem of equal protection for 
reason that each state would be free to interpret the effect that social security would have with 
regards to its own residents. In order to have a uniform national standard in which all persons 
are treated equally based upon contribution it is necessary that there be one uniform 
interpretation of what social security constitutes and it does not constitute an employee pension 
plan. 
If the agency can determine, based upon their interpretation of the law, that as long as an 
employer contributes to social security while you are employed by them during the base period 
then the agency can deduct all social security payments from your unemployment benefits it 
would be contrary to the intent of the Social Security Act. 
The agency by creative interpretation is denying appellant's right to social security 
benefits by defining them as "retirement" even though Congressional intent was that they are 
"old age benefits and a form of social insurance" to keep people like appellant from the rigors of 
the poor house; however, social security benefits do not provide nor maintain the quality and 
dignity of life but they do insure some form of old age supplement. 
11 
Pursuant to the states definition of retirement it is contrary to federal law and is not 
consistent with the purpose of the Social Security act which considers social security to be "old 
age benefits or a form of social insurance". For the state of Utah to make "social security" 
benefits a disqualifying remuneration it should have listed it as a separate category. 
RECOMPUTATION OF BENEFITS 
The decision by the agency to recompute benefits payable to appellant was pursuant to 
U.C.A. 35-4-401(2)(c) "Computation of Benefits" as follows: 
"The "weekly benefit amount" of an individual who is receiving, or 
who is eligible to receive, based on the individual's previous employment, a 
pension, which includes a governmental, social security, or other pension, 
retirement or disability retirement pay, under a plan maintained or contributed 
to by a base period employer is the "weekly benefit amount" which is 
computed under this section less 100% of such retirement benefits, that are 
attributable to a week, disregarding any fraction of $1." 
therefore appellant's weekly unemployment compensation benefit was reduced 100% and 
benefit amount calculated to be zero based upon the fact that he was receiving social security 
benefits. 
During hearing July 1, 1996 held before the Administrative Law Judge, Norman Barnes, 
appellant stated his disagreement with U.C.A. 35-4-401(2) "Computation of Benefits" and the 
Judge indicated as follows: [Transcript Page 14 line 6-20] 
JUDGE It doesn't matter what they pay in to the Social Security. It doesn't 
matter the amount they pay in. It only matters, from the law, whether 
or not that employer is a contributing employer. That's all it's 
saying. We'll cut out the rhetoric and it's telling you that if the 
employer is paying in to the social security - the base period 
employer is paying in to the social security fund, then those monies 
would be deducted. Not at the amount they pay in. 
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CLAIMANT They can take everything from 637 down and say that they can take 
that away from my unemployment? Everything I make from 1937 
through 1994. 
JUDGE Again, what the law is trying to get around or trying to look at is 
the individual that may have already been receiving social 
security benefits, and he works for another employer that after 
that period of time-after the period of time that he's filing for 
social security benefits and that employer then did not 
contribute it to the amount that he's receiving in social security 
benefits. 
[Transcript pg 19 line 1-10] 
JUDGE Again, what a—what a rule actually does Mr. Harrington is it 
further identifies the law. If you can show me that there ... 
CLAIMANT Well... 
JUDGE The role of the Department is in conflict with the law, (undiscernible) 
CLAIMANT Well to—Well to me, you're interpreting it one way, I'm 
interpreting it another. 
JUDGE Well guess whose interpretation is going to count in this case? 
Clearly, if the agency interpretation is in conflict with the legislative intent, it is not the 
agency duty to interpret the legislative intent. 
The agency application and interpretation of the statute, as explained to appellant during 
hearing 7/1/96 [R-4; T-13, Line 36-38] is that the state considers social security to be retirement 
under a plan maintained or contributed to by a base period employer. If any base period 
employers contribute to social security, the agency would then consider the social security you 
receive as retirement. 
Any base period employer who pays into the social security fund during anytime 
claimant is employed by them the agency considers all social security benefits paid into the fund 
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to be retirement and subject to deduction; however, the agency will not deduct any moneys paid 
into the fund by the base period employer at the amount they paid in but will consider total 
social security benefit payment to be deductible. [R-42; T-14 , Line 6-20] 
The way the statute reads, if any person, collecting social security payments and 
employed, should ever become unemployed through no fault of their own and experience a 
temporary hardship, said person would never receive unemployment compensation if their base 
period employer has paid into the social security fund. The agency has effectively routed 
unemployment funds into their agency with the intention of never paying any funds to the 
unemployed worker who collects social security benefits. This goes against public policy and 
legislative intent enacting the unemployment compensation act. 
The state cannot take away a persons right to social security by creatively defining it as 
"retirement" and then recompute their weekly unemployment benefit amount to be reduced by 
the amount of social security received. 
NO-FAULT OVERPAYMENT 
A no-fault overpayment was created by the agency when appellant received a retroactive 
social security check in March 1996; however, this was after the time appellant had filed for 
unemployment benefits, had filled out the application for benefits correctly, and stated that he 
had applied for Social Security benefits. The Department was notified that appellant had applied 
for social security and continued to determine his eligibility and pay unemployment benefits 
directly to the appellant. 
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In January 1996 appellant began to receive monthly social security checks and this was 
disclosed by him to the agency when his unemployment claim was re-opened by filling out the 
"Retirement Income Form" [R-4,16]. The agency determined him eligible for unemployment 
compensation then later reversed that decision and created a no-fault overpayment due to the 
agency. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that appellant "...had properly notified the 
Department that he had filed for Social Security benefits when he filed an additional claim in 
January 1996. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the claimant attempted to 
mislead the Department as to his eligibility for Social Security benefits...claimant was not at 
fault in the creation of the $5,967 overpayment for the weeks he claimed and received 
unemployment benefits...". [R-59] 
U.A.C. R562-406-502 "Responsibility" 
(1) The claimant is responsible for providing all of the information 
requested in written documents as well as any verbal request from a Department 
representative. If the claimant has provided such information, then receives 
benefits to which he is not entitled through an error of the Department or an 
employer, he is not at fault for the overpayment. 
(2) "Through no fault of his own" does not mean the claimant can 
shift responsibility for providing correct information to another person such as 
a spouse, parent or friend. The claimant is responsible for all information 
required on his claim..." 
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Pursuant to the agency's own rule, appellant is not responsible for the creation of the 
overpayment and the agency has the burden of responsibility when appellant had notified the 
Department of the filing for social security benefits, had marked all appropriate boxes on his 
claims for unemployment compensation that appellant had applied for social security benefits 
and had notified the agency as early as his first claim for benefits 6/6/95. 
Appellant is in a "Catch-22" situation wherein it would be a hardship to penalize him for 
a situation that was not created by himself, he has no resources to pay the departments "no-fault 
overpayment" and should he secure any future employment appellant would only be allowed a 
certain income pursuant to his social security guidelines. Appellant would never qualify for 
unemployment benefits pursuant to the agencies interpretation of the statute should he be out of 
work through no fault of his own. 
Appellant was entitled to unemployment benefits and if any no-fault overpayment exists 
then it should be waived by the agency since it would create a hardship now and in the future for 
the appellant to repay. 
Appellant was a displaced worker when he applied for and was determined eligible for 
unemployment compensation. He was truly experiencing a hardship given the fact that he was 
receiving no other income at the time he applied for unemployment compensation. Appellant 
made full disclosure to the agency that he had applied for social security benefits; however, no 
social security benefits were paid to him during his initial claim for unemployment 
compensation. 
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Appellant again is in a "Catch-22" situation wherein he was awarded unemployment 
compensation due to his status as a displaced worker and had met eligibility requirements. He 
furthermore sought other employment and when found he again returned to the work force. Due 
to appellant's age he is required to perform certain duties at a lower rate of pay therefore it puts 
him in a situation of collecting social security payments in addition to work to make ends meet 
and not become a public charge. 
To assess a no-fault overpayment to appellant with no resources to repay it would make 
it a hardship and also it was not the intent of Congress to penalize him for collecting social 
security benefits while trying to maintain a quality of life and not one of public charge. 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS 
Article I Section 27 of the Utah Constitution states that "frequent recurrence to 
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free 
government". 
By virtue of appellant receiving social security benefits the agency requires him to fill 
out a "Retirement Income Form" and determined, pursuant to statute, that his unemployment 
compensation benefits would be reduced to zero based upon "retirement" received, is not what 
Congress had intended, nor is social security defined as retirement but social insurance. Asking 
claimant to disclose any social security or other retirement payments received and not base the 
hardship decision of unemployment compensation upon his household income is not a 
fundamental principle of fairness. 
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To penalize a claimant based upon his collection of "social security" or "retirement" 
payments and not penalize another is fundamentally unfair; however, a spouse may very well be 
getting payment for a pension plan or social security benefits and as the agency determination of 
a hardship is applied is unfair. Not applying household income in making determination of a 
hardship is in and of itself discriminatory and fundamentally unfair. 
Amendment Fourteen United States Constitution states that one individual cannot be 
treated differently than another; however, that is what the agency is doing in determining 
eligibility of compensation. 
Where there is a mixed question of state and federal law, federal law should prevail 
pursuant to the United States Constitution supremacy clause. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was entitled to unemployment compensation and should not be penalized for 
receiving social security benefits since Congressional intent and federal courts have stated that 
social security is a type of social insurance not "retirement" as defined by Utah statute. 
Appellant also was not at fault in the creation of a no-fault overpayment award and this 
award should be set aside and appellant determined not to owe the overpayment pursuant to the 
agency interpretation of what defines "retirement". 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant requests the court (1) reverse the agency ruling denying unemployment 
compensation and assessing a no-fault overpayment award and (2) find that the state of Utah's 
statutory interpretation of "retirement" is not consistent with federal law and Congressional 
intent that there be one uniform national standard. 
DATED this n ?L day of 0 /9/v a .9/?~y , 1997. 
Eugene Q. Harrigton ' 
Appellant Pro Se 
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